Missouri Law Review
Volume 66
Issue 1 Winter 2001

Article 11

Winter 2001

Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College Education--Children of Divorce
and the Constitutional Implications of Noncustodial Parents
Providing for Higher Education
Lindsay E. Cohen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lindsay E. Cohen, Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College Education--Children of Divorce and the Constitutional
Implications of Noncustodial Parents Providing for Higher Education, 66 MO. L. REV. (2001)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Cohen: Cohen: Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College Education

Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College
Education? Children of Divorce and the
Constitutional Implications of Noncustodial
Parents Providing for Higher Education
In re MarriageofKohring'
I. NTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that in an age when obtaining a college education has
become increasingly popular and necessary, litigation involving the
responsibility of parents to pay for or contribute to the costs of their child's
college education has also increased.2 This Note discusses the controversial
issues of whether a parent has such an obligation and whether this obligation
extends to noncustodial divorced parents. The results of much of the litigation
throughout the United States on this topic vary greatly depending on the facts
and circumstances of each case In order to fully comprehend the current
litigation involving noncustodial divorced parents' obligation to support their
children's college education, it is imperative to study the origin of this
controversy within our legal system. This Note analyzes the constitutionality of
a statutory obligation imposed on noncustodial parents requiring them to
contribute toward their child's college education.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1989, the marriage of Steven Snodgrass and Ellen Snodgrass (now
Kohring) was dissolved in a proceeding before the Circuit Court of St. Louis
County.' At that time, the couple had two minor children, Julie ('Daughter")
and Michael5 The court awarded primary physical custody of both children to
Ellen Snodgrass ("Mother"). Without primary physical custody Steven

1. 999 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1999).
2. Annotation, Responsibility of Noncustodial Divorced Parent to Payfor, or
Contributeto, Costs ofChild's CollegeEducation, 99 A.L.R.3d 322, § 2, at 329 (1980)
[hereinafter College Education] According to the American Council on Education, the
average annual tuition costs at a four-year college range from S10,900 - S23,650
depending on whether the institution is public or private. See College? It's a Bargaint,
U.S.NEWs, Jan. 15,2001, available at http'//www.usnews.comusnewslvstats010115/
main.htm (visited Feb. 2,2001).
3. College Education,supranote 2, § 2, at 329.
4. See In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Mo. 1999).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Snodgrass ("Father") was required to pay child support.7 The child support order
was modified in 1994, when the court increased Father's child support payment
to $900 per month.'
In 1997, Daughter applied to the University of Missouri-Columbia. 9 In
order to compel Father to pay a portion of Daughter's college education
expenses, Mother filed a motion to modify their current child support
arrangement.'0 Father then filed a motion to dismiss and a cross-motion to
terminate child support."
The St. Louis County Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing. 2 Judge
Samuel J. Hais overruled Father's motions and ordered him to pay eighty percent
of Daughter's college expenses. 3 In addition, the court ordered Father to pay
a portion of Mother's attorney's fees. 4
Father appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court alleging that the Missouri
statute permitting child support awards for college expenses, Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 452.340.5, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. 5 In addition, Father
7. Id.
8. Id. Father was employed as an independent contractor for a computer consulting
business. For the years 1994 through 1997, his annual income ranged from $78,000 to
nearly $100,000. Id. at 234.
9. Id. at 231.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. In relevant part, Section 452.340.5 states:
If when a child reaches age eighteen, the child is enrolled in and attending a
secondary school program of instruction, the parental support obligation shall
continue, if the child continues to attend and progresses toward completion
of said program, until the child completes such program or reaches age
twenty-one, whichever first occurs. If the child is enrolled in an institution
of vocational or higher education not later than October first following
graduation from a secondary school or completion of a graduation
equivalence degree program and so long as the child enrolls for and completes
at least twelve hours of credit each semester, ... at an institution of vocational
or higher education and achieves grades sufficient to reenroll at such
institution, the parental support obligation shall continue until the child
completes his or her education, or until the child reaches the age of twentytwo, whichever first occurs. To remain eligible for such continued parental
support.., the child shall submit to each parent a transcript... provided by
the institution of vocational or higher education which includes the courses
the child is enrolled in and has completed for each term, the grades and credits
received for each such course, and.., the courses which the child is enrolled
in for the upcoming term and the number of credits for each course.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340.5 (Supp. 1999).
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claimed that he should not be required to pay support payments or attorney's
fees because Daughter did not comply with the reporting requirements of the
statute "6' and the evidence did not support the7disproportionate assessment of
support payments or award of attorney's fees.'
The Missouri Supreme Court held that the statute permitting child support
awards for college expenses did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, nor did
it impinge upon a fundamental right. 8 The court upheld the statute as
constitutional because it is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
"protecting the children of a marriage that is dissolved." 9
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. ChildSupport and College Educationat Common Lav
The general approach, at common law, for resolving whether parents had
an obligation to fund their child's college education was based on the notion that
parents are required to furnish "necessaries" for their minor children until such
time as their children reach the age of majority, become self-supporting, or are
emancipated." Thus, early court decisions contemplating parents' obligations
to fund their children's college education rest in large part on the courts'
interpretation of whether a college education constituted a "necessity" at
common law.2 '
Middlebury College v. Chandler," decided in 1844, is probably the earliest
reported case in the United States to consider whether a college education is a
"necessity."' In a suit by the college to recover tuition from the son whose
father was then deceased, the court refused to hold that a college education was
a necessity. The Middlebury decision explained that while necessaries were

16. See In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.V.2d 228, 231 (Mo. 1999). Father
argued that Daughter did not give him a transcript showing him the courses that she was
enrolled in, her grades, and credits received. Id at 233-34. Mother admitted that these
requirements were not met until May 1998. Id. at 234.
17. Id. at 231.
at 232.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 233.
20. See Calogeras v. Calogeras, 163 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ohio Misc. 1959); see also
Wynn v. Wynn, No. 441, 1928 WL 3177 (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 1928); Middlebury Coll.
v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683 (1844).
21. See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 171 N.E. 386, 387 (Ind.Ct. App. 1930); Halstead
v. Halstead, 239 N.Y.S. 422 (App. Div. 1930); Wynn, 1928 WL 3177, at *1; Calogeras,
163 N.E.2d at 715; Middlebury, 16 Vt. at 683; Esteb v. Esteb, 244 P. 264,265-66 (Wash.
1926).
22. 16 Vt. 683 (1844).
23. See Calogeras, 163 N.E.2d at 716.
24. See Middlebury, 16 Vt. at 686.
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not limited to things which were strictly essential to support life (i.e., food,
clothing, medicine), the term did not extend so far as to include a college
education.' By comparing a college education to a common school education,
the court concluded that (in 1844, when the case was decided) a college
education was not necessary in a legal sense, whereas a common school
education was necessary because it was essential to one's overall usefulness in
society and the ability to transact business.26 An underlying basis for the court's
determination was that most people did not have a college education, so it could
not possibly be considered an essential necessity of life when so many people
were able to manage without one."
Almost a century after Middlebury, in Wynn v. Wynn, 23 the Ohio Court of
Appeals reached a similar conclusion that the parental obligation to furnish
"necessaries" does not include a college education. In Wynn, the court chose not
to base its analysis on whether college was commonly accepted as necessary at
that time, and instead focused on compulsory school laws that only required
school attendance until age eighteen.29 The court ruled that in a divorce case,
there was no law requiring parents to send their child to college (as compared to
education requirements under compulsory school laws), and thus, parents should
not be obligated to pay for such a "laudable act."3 The court reasoned that if
parents wanted to send their children to college, that was the parents' decision
and it was not the proper place for the court to interfere or substitute the court's
judgment for that of a parent.3
In Esteb v. Esteb,32 the Washington Supreme Court considered whether a
college education was necessary under the common law rule and determined that
given a change in conditions since Middlebury, a college education was
necessary, and thus divorced parents should be obligated to pay for their
children's college education.33 The court concluded that when Middlebury was
decided, college graduates were very rare, but by 1926, attending college had
become much more common.34 The court reasoned that without a college
education a child would be severely restrained from pursuing most trades and
professions because he would be forced to compete against people who

25. Id. As compared to a college education, the court determined that a common
school education was a necessity. A common school education is the preliminary
education one receives before advancing to more extensive study in college. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. No. 441, 1928 WL 3177 (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 1928).
29. Id. at *2; see also Calogeras v. Calogeras, 163 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ohio Misc.
1959).
30. Wynn, 1928 WL 3177, at *2.
31. Id.

32. 244 P. 264 (Wash. 1926).
33. Id. at 265-66.
34. Id. at 266.
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possessed greater skills as a result of such higher educations The court noted
that it was especially important for noncustodial parents to provide the
opportunity for a higher education because "[p]arents, when deprived of the
custody of their children, very often refuse to do for such children what natural
instinct would ordinarily prompt them to do."36 In concluding that a college
education was a necessity, Esteb started a trend in which courts began to require
noncustodial divorced parents to fund their children's college educationY
B. Child Support and CollegeEducation UnderMissouriLav
In Missouri, under the common law, a parent has a duty and obligation to
provide for the reasonable needs of his children. 38 Thus, in Missouri, the
question at common law is whether a college education was a "reasonable need"
for one's child.3 9 Similar to the "necessity" analysis used in Esteb, the Kansas
City Court of Appeals in 1969 held in Anderson v. Anderson that the
noncustodial parent would be required to pay child support so that his daughter
could attend a private college, because the daughter's desire to attend college
was a "reasonable" one.4' Since Anderson, it has become settled law in Missouri
that a noncustodial parent may be obligated to provide his children with an
education beyond a secondary or high-school level.42
In Sunderwirth v. Williams,43 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Springfield District articulated a list of factors the court should consider to
determine whether it is reasonable to require child support payments by the

35. Id. at 266-267.

36. Id. at 267.
37. For an extensive discussion of whether the cost of a college education should
be included in awarding child support, see Calogerasv. Calogeras,163 N.E.2d 713, 71819 (Ohio Misc. 1959); Jackman v. Short, 109 P.2d 860 (Or. 1941).

It should be noted that in Jacknan,the Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that public
policy favored awarding support for a child to pursue a college education, especially
when the child displayed a sufficient capacity for learning. The court concluded,
"[o]rdinarily, a child of divorced parents is in greater need of the help that a college
education can give than one living in a home where marital harmony abides." Jackman,
109 P.2d at 872.
38. See Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (citing
Lodahl v. Papenberg, 227 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1955)).

39. Id.
40. 437 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).

41. Id. at 710. The court based its analysis on Sportsman v. Sportsman, 409
S.W.2d 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966), which held that the court had the authority to modify
a divorce decree to require the noncustodial parent to provide for his child's college
education because it was not unreasonable for the child to desire to go to college. See
Anderson, 437 S.W.2d at 710.
42. See Sunderwirth v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
43. 553 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
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noncustodial parent for his child's college education." A trial court should
consider five factors when trying to determine if an allowance should be made
for a college education and the amount of that allowance: "the financial ability
of the father;45 the ability and capacity of the child for college work;46 the
nearness of the child to his (or her) majority; whether the child is self-supporting
or not,47 and the father's willingness to provide for such education, as shown by
some agreement or other indication on his part."4 As is customary with
allowances made in the dissolution of marriage, the trial court has considerable
discretion in analyzing all five factors.49 In effect, the five factor analysis
provided by Sunderwirth limits the court's holding in Anderson so that
noncustodial parents are not required to bear the full expense of a college
education for their children, regardless of their financial means.50 Rather, only
when the court determines it reasonable, after considering all five factors, is a
noncustodial parent obligated to pay full or part of the cost of his child's college
education. 5
The Missouri Dissolution of Marriage Ac 2 became effective January 1,
1974 and provided that the court may order "parents owing a duty of support to
a child of their marriage" to pay child support after the court considers all
relevant factors. 3 One of the factors listed in the original Act was "the physical
and emotional condition of the child, and his educational needs.

'54

In 1974, the

Act did not clarify whether "educational needs" included a child's college
education. In 1988, the Missouri legislature amended Missouri Revised Statutes
Section 452.340 by rewriting the entire section. 5 The 1988 amendment included

44. Id. at 893-94.
45. Financial ability of a parent to pay for or contribute to the costs of higher
education is a factor considered in many jurisdictions. See College Education,supra
note 2, § 10, at 358.
46. Academic ability of the child to do college work is a factor considered in many
jurisdictions. Academic ability may be demonstrated by "good grades, high rank in class,
favorable examination results, and receipt of scholarships." See College Education,
supranote 2, § 9, at 355.
47. Ability of the child to be self-supporting is a factor considered in many
jurisdictions. See College Education,supranote 2, § 11, at 361.

48. Sunderwirth, 553 S.W.2d at 893-94 (citing E.Le Fevre, Annotation, Education
as Element in Allowancefor Benefit of Child in Decree of Divorce or Separation,56

A.L.R.2d 1207, § 1[b], at 1209 (1957) (citations omitted)).
49. See Sunderwirth v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.

Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340 (1974).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340 (1974).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340 (1974).
See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.340 (1988).
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subsection 5, which pertains to college education as a form of child support!'
In 1988, the legislature answered the question whether noncustodial parents
could be required to pay child support for their children's college education by
enacting statutory language to provide explicitly for this type of support
obligation. The Missouri legislature has amended Missouri Revised Statutes
Section 452.340.5 three times since 1988,' but the underlying premise remains
the same: when a child is enrolled in an "institution of vocational or higher
education," under certain circumstances detailed in Missouri Revised Statutes
Section 452.340.5, the "parental support obligation shall continue until the child
completes his or her education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-two,
whichever first occurs." 8 It should be noted that this provision does not
automatically make a parent responsible for the actual costs of a child's postsecondary education. 59 The court must considereducational expenses, including
the cost of college, when determining the proper child support amount, but is not
requiredto hold a parent liable for his child's post-secondary education costs.'
C. ConstitutionalAnalysis
Many states have attempted to resolve controversy over whether
noncustodial divorced parents should have to provide post-secondary education
for their children by enacting specific statutory provisions dealing with this

56. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340 (1988). In 1988, subsection 5 provided:
If the child is attending an institution of vocational or higher education, the
parental support obligation shall continue until the child completes his
education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-tvo, whichever first
occurs. If the child is attending such a school, the child or obligated parent
may petition the court to amend the order to direct the obligated parent to
make the payments directly to the child.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340.5 (1988).
57. Section 452.340.5 was amended in 1989, 1990, and 1998. In 1989, subsection
5 was amended to include the requirements that a child must meet in order for the
parental support obligation to continue. In addition, the legislature defined the terms
"institution of vocational education" and "higher education" as they are applied in the
provision. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340.5 (1994). The 1990 amendment extended the
parental support obligation to secondary school for children over the age of eighteen.
See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.340.5 (1994). The 1998 amendment makes a limited number
of exceptions to the required number of credit hours a child must be enrolled in to qualify
for the continued parental support obligation. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340.5 (Supp.
1999).
58. Mo. REV.

STAT.

§ 452.340.5 (Supp. 1999). For the statutory text, see supra

note 15.
59. See Shiflett v. Shiflett, 954 S.W.2d 489,493 (Mo. Ct App. 1997) (citing Leahy
v. Leahy, 858 S.W.2d 221,225 (Mo. 1993)).
60. Id
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issue. 6' Since the enactment of these types of statutes, the constitutionality of
those statutes requiring divorced parents to pay for or contribute to their child's
college education has been challenged in many states.62 The constitutional
argument alleged is that a statutory provision making divorced parents liable for
the post-secondary education costs of their children violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6a
When a court reviews the constitutionality of a statute, it does so under the
presumption that the statute is constitutional.' The party challenging the
constitutionality of the provision bears the burden of proving that the statute is
unconstitutional.65 For a court to invalidate a statute, it must determine that the
statute "clearly and undoubtedly contravenes the constitution" and "plainly and
palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution."'" If a court is
in doubt about the constitutionality of a statute, it will resolve the uncertainty by
determining that the statute is valid.67
Equal protection mandates that persons who are similarly situated in
relation to a statute must be treated in the same manner.68 In other words, people
cannot be unfairly discriminated against. In determining whether a statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause, a court will first determine whether the
statute in question "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or
impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution."69 If so, the court will evaluate the statute using strict judicial
scrutiny to determine whether the "classification is necessary to accomplish a
compelling state interest."7' If the court determines that the classification neither
burdens a suspect class, nor impinges upon a fundamental right, then instead of

61. See College Education, supranote 2, § 2, at 329.
62. See College Education,supranote 2, § 2, at 329; see, e.g., Ex ParteBayliss,
550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (ll.
1978);
Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E. 960 (nd. 1991); In re Marriage of Vrban, 293
N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980); LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993); Curtis v.
Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995); Birchfield v. Birchfield, 417 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1988);
Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978).
63. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution in pertinent part provides: "No State shall ...
deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. See Linton v. Mo. Veterinary Med. Bd., 988 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Mo. 1999).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See State v. Young, 695 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Mo. 1985).
68. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
69. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); see also
Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project v. Holden, 959 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. 1998).
70. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
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strict judicial scrutiny, the court will determine whether the classification is
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest."'
When a class within a group of persons has been "saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process," the
classification is suspect and deserving of strictjudicial scrutiny.' Traditionally,
only classifications based on race, national origin, and illegitimacy have
constituted "suspect classes" under the law of equal protection 3 In some cases,
discrimination based on sex is considered a suspect classification, but in these
instances, the allegedly discriminatory statute is evaluated based on intermediate
scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny.74
If a statute impinges upon a fundamental right, the court will evaluate the
statute under strict judicial scrutiny.75 A fundamental right is a right that is
guaranteed by the Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly.7 The United
States Supreme Court has held that fundamental rights include such basic
liberties as: the right to free speech,' the right to vote,78 freedom of interstate
travel,79 and the right to personal privacy."
Legislation that does not create suspect classifications or impinge on
fundamental rights is upheld against equal protection attack only when the
legislation is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."'" Aparty
that challenges legislation has the obligation to present facts and arguments that
demonstrate that the classification as applied is not rationalY' The court will
presume that social and economic legislation is rational because state legislatures

71. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 (1979); see also Missouriansfor Tax
Justice, 959 S.W.2d at 103.
72. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
73. See Call v. Heard, 925 SAV.2d 840, 846 (Mo. 1996).
74. See Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464,469 (1981);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Mo.

1992).
75. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); see
also Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project v. Holden, 959 S.V.2d 100, 103 (Mo.
1998).
76. See Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Mo.
1991).
77. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927).
78. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964).
79. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972).
80. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,251 (1891); see also Kramer
v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,

634 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 512.
81. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981).
82. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
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are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power.83 This rationality
presumption can only be overcome by a "clear showing of arbitrariness and
irrationality."' Under rational basis scrutiny, a statutory classification is
constitutional if any facts to justify it can be reasonably conceivedSS When a
court evaluates a statute to determine if it is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose, the court must not question the wisdom, social
desirability, or economic policy on which a statute is based; these are matters for
the legislature to determine."6
D. Application of ConstitutionalAnalysis
Among states that have adopted a statutory provision requiring divorced
parents to financially support their children by paying for their post-secondary
education, very few statutes have been struck down as unconstitutional, either
under the United States Constitution or under the individual state constitution.87
Most states that have considered the issue have upheld the state statute under
equal protection analysis by determining that the statute was rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose."8
In Childersv. Childers,89 the Washington Supreme Court held that a state
statute that required a parent to support a child beyond the age of majority while
the child pursued a college education was constitutional."0 The court based its
opinion on the long standing common law in the state of Washington that a
divorced parent may have a duty of support for his child's college education if
the child demonstrates an ability for college work and providing support does not

83. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961).
84. Fust v. Attorney Gen. for Mo., 947 S.W.2d 424,432 (Mo. 1997).
85. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425.
86. See Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence County, 636 S.W.2d
324, 327 (Mo. 1982).
87. See, e.g., Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995) (holding that a statute
allowing the court to order separated, divorced, or unmarried parents to provide for the
educational costs of their children over the age of eighteen was unconstitutional because
it was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose). Although not based
on constitutional analysis, the following courts have held that separated, divorced, or
unmarried parents have no legal duty to provide for their children after the age of
majority: Huckaba v. Huckaba, 336 So. 2d 1363 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976); In re Marriage
of Plummer, 735 P.2d 165 (Col. 1987); Grapin v. Grapin,450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984);
West v. West, 312 A.2d 920 (Vt. 1973).
88. See, e.g., Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (ll. 1978); Neudecker
v. Neudecker, 577 N.E. 960 (Ind.1991); In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa
1980); LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993); Birchfield v. Birchfield, 417
N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1988); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978).
89. 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978).
90. Id. at 209.
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cause the parent significant hardship.9 The court determined that even though
the statute in question did distinguish between married and unmarried parents,
a rational basis existed for this distinction.' The statute was upheld because the
court reasoned that children of divorced parents face many disadvantages when
compared to children of married parents. In seeking to minimize those
disadvantages whenever possible, the court found that the statute achieved a
legitimate governmental interest.9 3 Because the court determined that many
married parents willingly make financial sacrifices for their child's education,
regardless of their child's age, the statute merely allowed the courts to secure for
children of divorced parents what they would have received from their parents
had there not been a divorce.' Thus, divorced parents were not discriminated
against in the process because they were only required to support their children
in away similar to what they would have done if they had remained married.9S
Under analysis similar to that of the Childers court, the Iowa Supreme
Court in In re Marriageof Vrban96 upheld a statute requiring an obligation for
child support to continue until the age of twenty-two for children who were fulltime college students.' The court reasoned that the legislature could have found
that most parents who remain married support their children through college,
whereas, even well-intentioned parents who are deprived custody of their
children, sometimes refuse to support their children in the same manner they
would have had the family remained together."s The court also determined that
the statute furthered the state's legitimate interest in higher education.' In the
court's analysis of the statute, it noted that the statute did not require support in
all cases and that the trial court could award support, in its discretion, after
balancing several factors that were considered for child support in general.'o
InKujawinskiv. Kujawinsk, °' the Illinois Supreme Court held that a statute
allowing the court to order child support for a child's education, whether the
child was of minor or majority age, was reasonably related to a legitimate

91. Id at 207. The Esteb case was decided in Washington in 1926 confirming the
common law. See supratext accompanying notes 32-36.
92. See Childers, 575 P.2d at 209.
93. Id. at 208.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980).
97. Id. at 202.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The factors the Iowa court considered are similar to the Sunder irth
factors used in Missouri. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51. Factors to consider
in Iowa include: the financial condition of the parent, the ability of the child to do
college work, the age of the child, and whether the child is self-supporting. Vrban, 293
NAV.2d at 202.
101. 376 N.E.2d 1382 (Ul1. 1978).
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legislative purpose.' °2 The court noted that in enacting the statute, the legislature
must have been cognizant that the very nature of divorce has a major economic
and personal impact on the lives of all those involved. 3 Because the court
determined that noncustodial divorced parents often times could not be relied on
to voluntarily support their children to the same extent they would have had they
not divorced, the court concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in
mitigating the potential harm to children of divorced families." ° As a result, the
court held that the statute was reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.105
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In determining the constitutionality of Missouri Revised Statutes Section
452.340.5 under the.Equal Protection Clause, the Missouri Supreme Court
undertook a three part analysis.' 6 First, the court assessed whether the statute
operated to the disadvantage of a suspect class.' 7 Next, the court considered if
the statute impinged on any fundamental right.' 3 Finally, the court addressed
whether the statute was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 109
For the first part of the court's analysis, it considered the standard set out
by the United States Supreme Court for suspect classification. "0 The court
attempted to determine whether unmarried, divorced, or legally separated parents
constituted a suspect class requiring strict judicial scrutiny."' The court noted
that traditionally, suspect classification was reserved for discrimination based on
race, national origin, illegitimacy, and sex." 2 The court concluded that no
authority recognized unmarried, divorced, or legally separated parents as a

102. Id. at 1389-90.
103. Id. at 1389.
104. Id. at 1390. The court explained several reasons why divorced parents cannot
always be relied on to voluntarily support their children after the divorce: when spouses
go their separate ways and live independent lives they accrue additional expenses that
they would not have had if the family remained one unit; noncustodial parents may have
a loss of concern for children that are not in their immediate care and custody; and
sometimes noncustodial parents will refuse to pay support to their children out of
animosity directed at the custodial parent. Id. at 1389-90.
105. Id. at 1389.
106. See In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Mo. 1999).
107. Id. at 232.
108. Id. at 232-33.
109. Id. at 233.
110. Id. at 232; see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973).
111. See Kohring, 999 S.W.2d at 232.
112. Id.; see Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 846-47 (Mo. 1996); State v. Stokely,
842 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Mo. 1992).
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suspect class."' Without any authority upon which to change the traditional
analysis for suspect classification, the court declined to create a new suspect
class for unmarried, divorced, or legally separated parents." 4
In addition, the court analyzed whether Section 452.340.5 burdened a class
other than unmarried, divorced, or legally separated parents who could be
considered a suspect class."' The court considered whether the statute burdened
illegitimate children and children from broken homes." 6 Noting that illegitimacy
may constitute a suspect class, the court concluded that the statute did not burden
illegitimate children." 7 While alienating children from their noncustodial
parents may be an unfortunate result of the statute, the court found that the verys
purpose of the statute in question was to support children, not to burden them."
Thus, the statute did not impose a burden on illegitimate children creating an
equal protection violation." 9
Upon finding no equal protection violation of a suspect class, the court
entered its second mode of analysis; the court analyzed whether Section
452.340.5 impinged on any fundamental rights. 2 Recognizing traditional
fundamental rights such as the right to free speech, to vote, and to freedom of
interstate travel,'2 ' the court searched for a fundamental right that might be
implicated by the statute in question.' The court considered the fundamental
right to parent, but determined that Section 452.340.5 only involved "economic"

113. See In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228,232 (Mo. 1999).
114. Id.
115. Id. Father argued (in the alternative to finding that the statute unfairly
burdened unmarried, divorced, or legally separated parents) that the statute burdened a
recognized suspect class: illegitimate children and children from broken homes. Id.
116. Id Father argued that the statute burdened illegitimate children by alienating
them from the parent who was required to provide support for them. Id.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id In his dissenting opinion in Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265,272 (Pa. 1995),
Justice Montemuro mentioned that all child support distinguishes between children based
upon their parents' marital status; yet this does not invalidate all child support statutes.
The Missouri Supreme Court did not consider whether all child support could be
subject to the unfortunate result of noncustodial parents alienating their children when
they are required to make support payments, but was only concerned with support
payments for college expenses. See In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228,231-32
(Mo. 1999).
119. See Kohring, 999 S.W.2d at 232.
120. Id. at 232-33.
121. See Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Mo.
1991).
122. See Kohring, 999 S.W.2d at 232. Father argued that Section 452340.5
impinged upon unmarried parents' fundamental right to decide whether to grant financial
support to their children when they could not legally exert any control over their children
because they had attained the age of majority. Id.
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rights."z The court acknowledged that whether a parent has a fundamental right
to avoid providing support for his or her children past the age of eighteen was
a question of first impression in Missouri.' 24 After looking to cases in other
jurisdictions that had considered the question,"2 the court agreed with the
uniformly held notion that a parent does not have a fundamental right to avoid
providing support for his or her children past the age of eighteen.12 6 Thus, the
court held that Section 452.340.5 did not impinge on any fundamental right and
was therefore not subject to strict scrutiny.'27
Because the court determined that Section 452.340.5 did not involve a
suspect classification, nor did it impinge upon a fundamental right, the court's
final phase of analysis was whether the statute could withstand rational basis
scrutiny.Y The court considered whether the statute was "rationally related to
a legitimate state interest."'2 In addressing this question, the court noted the
presumption of rationality which legislation involving only economic rights
carries.'
The court concluded that the "state has a legitimate interest in
securing higher education opportunities for children from broken homes."'' As
a basis for its decision, the court turned to earlier child support cases in Missouri
that had recognized the special protection children of dissolved marriages
require. Specifically, the court considered its decision from Leahy v. Leahy, 3 '
in which the unanimous court recognized that "children of an existing marriage
derive many benefits that [children] of a dissolved marriage [are] deprived of
sharing," therefore, the state has a legitimate interest in "protecting the children
of a marriage that is dissolved."' 3 By requiring financially capable parents to
pay for or contribute to the college expenses of their children, the court
123. Id. The court stated:
The parent-child relationship is an associational right of basic importance in
our society, however a parent's financial obligations to his or her child are
considered merely economic consequences that do not critically affect
associational rights. Because father's asserted "right" involves only his
economic, rather than his associational interests with his daughter, section
452.340.5 is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980); Curtis v.
Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995); Birchfield v. Birchfield, 417 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1988);
Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978).
126. See In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Mo. 1999).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see supranote 83 and accompanying text.
131. Kohring,999 S.W.2d at 233.
132. 858 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. 1993).

133. In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Mo. 1999) (quoting Leahy,
858 S.W.2d at 230).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/11

14

Cohen: Cohen: Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College Education

CHILD SUPPORTFORCOLLEGE

2001]

concluded that Section 452.340.5 was rationally related to the legitimate state
interest of securing higher education opportunities for children of divorced
1M
parents.
Thus, in Kohring, the Missouri Supreme Court held that Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 452.340.5-the Missouri statute whereby noncustodial divorced
parents may be required to lend support to their children wishing to pursue
higher education-was constitutional because it did not burden a suspect class,
did not impinge upon 13a fundamental right, and was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. 1
V. COMMENT
The court's decision in Kohring to uphold statutory liability on unmarried,
legally separated, and divorced parents to pay post-secondary education costs of
their children is a natural progression of Missouri common law." There are
strong policy implications that support the court's finding. Unfortunately, for
those opposed to Missouri Revised Statutes Section 452.340.5, the court was
very brief in its rational basis analysis.'37 The court failed to include in its
opinion any underlying reasons for upholding the statute besides the conclusory
statement that Missouri has a legitimate interest in securing higher education
opportunities for children of broken homes. The court took for granted the
assumption that children of dissolved marriages suffer many disadvantages that
children of an intact marriage never encounter and offered no proof for this
13
assumption.

1

Pure rational basis scrutiny does not require the court to examine all
justifications for a statute that discriminates based on classification so long as
some rational basis existed for the legislature to have enacted the statute." Of
course, it is not the court's role to question the wisdom, social desirability, or
economic policy on which a statute is based, these are matters for the legislature
to determine.141 But, without offering any support for its assumption that
children of dissolved marriages suffer many disadvantages that children of an

134. Id The court also considered the fact that the statute only affected economic
interests as an additional basis for finding that the statute was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. Id.
135. Id at 232-33.
136. See Shiflett v. Shiflett, 954 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Sundervirth v.
Williams, 553 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704
(Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
137. See Kohring, 999 S.W.2d at 232-33.
138. Id. at 233.

139. Id.
140. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961).
141. See Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence County, 636 S.W.2d
324, 327 (Mo. 1982).
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intact marriage never encounter, the court calls into question the validity of its
conclusion that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
There are many strong policy arguments that justify treating the higher
education needs of children of broken homes different from the needs of children
from intact homes.'42 While it is not always true that children of divorce are
deprived of parental support for higher education or that children of intact
families are always provided financial support for college, children whose
parents remain married most often continue to receive support past the age of
majority when compared to children of divorce. 43 Children of divorce are often
deprived of economic support that they would normally receive from nuclear
families.'" Several jurisdictions outside of Missouri that have upheld the
constitutionality of post-secondary education support payments by divorced
parents have done so based on these type of policy considerations.14 In
Kohring,the Missouri Supreme Court does not refer to any of these concerns nor
does it cite to findings of the Missouri legislature as to the purpose of the statute.
The court's conclusion that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest would have been much stronger if it had explained the basis for its
ultimate determination.
The natural question to ask after the court's decision in Kohring is whether
Missouri has a legitimate interest in securing higher education opportunities for
all children, not just children from broken homes. Under Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 452.340, child support for post-secondary education is a
continuation of an existing support obligation by the parent. 4 6 Thus, the court

142. See, e.g., Michael A. Smyer & Teresa M. Cooney, ABA Nat ' Symp. on
Alimony and Child Support: Family Relations Across Adulthood: Implicationsfor
Alimony and ChildSupportDecisions, Apr. 24-25, 1987, at 1; Judith S. Wallerstein &
Shawna B. Corbin, Father Child Relationships After Divorce; Child Support and
EducationalOpportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1986).
143. See Robert M. Washburn, Post-MajoritySupport: Oh Dad, Poor Dad,44
TEMPLE L.Q. 319, 329 n.55 (1971). Most young adults attending college receive parental
support for a substantial percentage of the cost of their college education. See SEYMOUR
E.HARRJS, A STATISTICAL PORTRArr OF HIGHER EDUCATION 100, 114-23 (1972).
144. See LENORE J. WErIZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLurION 278 (1985). A divorce
decree awarding child support might not alleviate these problems. See Curtis v. Kline,
666 A.2d 265, 272 (Pa. 1995) (Montemuro, J., dissenting). When the noncustodial
parent is reluctant to provide financial support, the custodial parent (who traditionally has
less money than the noncustodial parent) often becomes the sole bearer of the child's
educational expenses, even where the noncustodial parent would have shared in this
burden, had the couple remained married. See WEITZMAN, supra, at 278.
145. See, e.g., Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1389-90 (11. 1978);
Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 207 (Wash. 1978); see also supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
146. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340.5 (Supp. 1999) (stating that when certain
conditions relating to the child's admittance and attendance in college are met the
"parental support obligation shall continue.. .", thus implying that the parental support
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is already involved in the family dissolution, as evidenced by the prior support
obligation. Modification of a support obligation is allowed under Section
452.370. By comparison, intact families do not ordinarily suffer intervention by
the courts, unless their children are abused or neglected."° In addition, the right
to privacy limits the legislature's ability to intervene in matters concerning
children's education."4 It can reasonably be inferred that a statute requiring all
parents to finance their children's education would be unconstitutional because
it would impinge on the right to prvacy." 9
VI. CONCLUSION
As most professional occupations now require an extensive education
beginning with undergraduate studies, it is not surprising to find more and more
parents sending their children to college to prepare for successful future
careers.' Even though a college education is not something all children may
be capable of achieving, courts are reluctant to deprive children of divorce the
opportunity to attend college merely because divorce has changed their financial
situation. In addition, the rationale behind child support payments is to provide
financial support for children until such time as they are capable ofproviding for
themselves; a time that in many cases occurs after college."' As a result of the
court's decision in Kohring,courts can require noncustodial divorced parents to
support their children after the age of majority by contributing to their child's
college education. In Missouri, such an obligation does not violate equal
protection."
LINDSAY E. COHEN

obligation already existed).
147. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1835-39 (1985); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Parentsas Fiduciaries,81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2406-07 (1995).
148. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters,

268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
149. See Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 273-74 (Pa. 1995) (Montemuro, J.,
dissenting).
150. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Postsecondary Education As Within
NondivorcedParent'sChild-SupportObligation, 42 A.L.R. 819, § 2 (1985).
151. Id.
152. See In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Mo. 1999).
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